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The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition 
agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish hog farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% of them reported to believe 
that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who 
believe the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We 
develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the 
boundary between contracts to be regarded as ￿enforceable￿ and ￿not-enforceable￿ and, simultaneously, the 
threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers￿ 
responds can be explained by cost-benefit calculations regarding the use of courts, (2) the legal 
￿enforceability￿ of contracts depends not only on the efficiency of the legal system, but also on the attributes 
of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller, and (3) the threshold of taking 
legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as the disruption of a 
valuable relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms.  
 




Effective contract enforcement has long been recognized as essential for markets to function. Only recently, 
however, economists have begun to study different mechanisms of contract enforcement empirically. 
Important contributions result from analyzing contracting practices in European economic history (e.g. 
Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Greif 1993), in developing countries (e.g. Fafchamps 1996; Woodruff 
1998) and most significantly, in transition economies (Greif and Kandel 1995; Koford and Miller 1995, 
1999; Henderly, Murell and Ryterman 1998; McMillan and Woodruff 1999a, 1999b; Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff 1999; Gow and Swinnen 1998, 2001; Gow, Streeter and Swinnen 2000). The latter cases are 
particularly interesting because the institutional environment for a market economy is only slightly 
emerging. Due to ineffective laws and courts, economic agents often have to rely on contracts ￿without the 
shadow of the law￿ (McMillan and Woodruff 1999a: 637). In addition, transition is seen as ￿an experiment 
in the interaction between the courts and relational contracting￿ (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 1999: 1). 
 
This paper contributes to this literature by examining the problem of contract enforcement through the legal 
system for contracts that govern transactions in the Polish agriculture. According to a survey we conducted 
in 1999, only 38.5% of 306 Polish hog farmers believed they could enforce contracts through legal 
proceedings (see Boger 2001a for details of the survey). Furthermore, hog farmer who believed courts could 
be used would except significant financial losses before taking a buyer to court. The data reveals a mean of 
financial losses of 5,414 Polish zloty and a remarkable variation ranging between 100 and 50,000 Polish 
zloty. Since hog farmers in Poland all act under the same law and on the same market, however, the 
inefficiencies of the legal system can hardly explain the significant variation in the responses received. Hence, this paper￿s main objective is to identify the factors that determine the extent to which economics 
factors consider the legal system as a viable enforcement mechanism. Why do some farmers not consider 
contract enforcement through courts at all? Is it only because they believe that the legal system is 
ineffective? Why would some farmers take a buyer to court if they already face financial losses of 100 Polish 
zloty, while other farmers would accept financial losses of 50,000 Polish zloty? Why do the costs enforcing 
contracts through the courts differ so much among economic agents in the same country? 
 
In the discussion that follows, we investigate a larger set of determinants theoretically and empirically in 
order to explain the difference in the assessment of the courts￿ efficacy and costs. We gathered seller-buyer 
transaction specific data to examine not only the influence of the seller￿s characteristics, but also those of the 
buyer, the transaction, the contract, the relationship and the business environment. Our approach is also 
based on a systematic investigation of costs and benefits relating to court enforcement. These costs and 
benefits are determined by a number of factors, in which the efficiency of the legal system is an important, 
but not exclusive determinant. 
 
We will show that: (1) the farmers￿ responds can be explained by cost-benefit calculations regarding the use 
of courts, (2) the legal ￿enforceability￿ of contracts depend not only on the efficiency of the legal system, but 
also on the attributes of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller and (3) 
the threshold of taking legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as 
the disruption of a valuable relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review the literature with regard to the 
costs and benefits of court enforcement and alternative enforcement mechanism. We then develop a reduced 
form model that captures the boundary between ￿not enforceable￿ and ￿enforceable￿ based on cost-benefit 
calculations regarding the maximum of financial losses a farmer would accept before taking a buyer to court. 
Third, we examine the data by means of regression analysis and discuss the results in relation to theoretical 
propositions and similar empirical outcomes. And finally, we draw conclusions for further research. 
 
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
 
The economic literature on contract enforcement shows two extreme traditions with regard to the role of 
courts in contract enforcement. The first, the legal centralism tradition, assumes that agreements and 
contracts can be best and almost costlessly enforced by the legal system. As Williamson (1985: 20) based on 
Galanter (1981: 1) characterize it: 
 
Most studies of exchange assume that efficacious rules regarding contract disputes are in place and are 
applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and low-cost way. The ￿legal centralism￿ tradition   
maintains that ￿dispute resolution require ￿access￿ to a forum external to the original social setting of the 
dispute [and that] remedies will be provided as prescribed in some body of authoritative learning and 
dispensed by experts who operate under the auspices of the state.￿ 
 
The second, the theory of self-enforcing agreements, implicitly or explicitly assumes that contracts between 
two parties are not enforceable through courts (e.g. Telser 1980; Klein and Leffler 1981; Bull 1987). As 
Telser (1980: 27) states: 
 
A self-enforcing agreement between two parties remains in force as long as each party believes himself to be 
better off by continuing the agreement than he would be by ending it. It is left to the judgment of the parties 
concerned to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the agreement. If one party violates the 
terms then the only recourse of the other party is to terminate the agreement after he discovers the violation. 
No third party intervenes to determine whether a violation has taken place or estimate the damages from that 
result from such a violation. 
 
To highlight the implications of these conflicting approaches, consider the following case. A seller and a 
buyer agree that the seller will deliver a particular good to the buyer to be paid for 14 days after delivery. 
The buyer receives the good but refuses to pay. Under the self-enforcing agreement assumption, the seller 
would take it and accept the financial loss, but never trade with the same buyer again.  Following the legal centralism approach, the seller instead would take immediately legal action by which the 
buyer would be forced to pay for the goods delivered. Under the assumption that state enforcement of 
contracts is costless, it is irrational to accept financial losses. 
 
Although these extreme assumptions, costlessly enforceable or not enforceable, may be useful for analytical 
purposes, they do not agree with an empirical analysis. In fact, empirical evidence shows that legal 
enforcement is often possible, but obviously costly. Therefore, it is more reasonable to think about the costs 
and benefits of court enforcement in a comparable way. What are the costs and benefits of court enforcement 
and how are they determined? The latter are obvious and straightforward: the compensation for losses 
resulting from a breach of contract. They depend on the value of the contract and on the ability of the courts 
to adequately determine the magnitude of damages and enforce claims resulting from a breach of contract.  
 
In regards to the costs of contract enforcement we distinguish them into two categories: direct costs and 
indirect costs. Direct costs of contract enforcement are time, effort and money that must be spent to take 
legal action (see Djankov et al. 2002). These are affected by (1) the efficiency of the legal system, (2) the 
type of agreement or contract and (3) the characteristics of the firm or individual. Indirect costs of court 
enforcement may arise in two ways: (1) the disturbance of a valuable relationship (see Mccauly 1963; 
Williamson 1979) and (2) the damage of firm￿s reputation in business or social networks (Ellickson 1991, 
1994).  In particular, Williamson (1979, 1985, 1991, 1996) emphasized that specific investments, which 
create valuable relationships, make both court ordering and self-enforcement very costly and give way to 
different ways of private ordering.  
 
In the following discussion, we will present a reduced form model that formalizes these ideas.  
 
A reduced form model of contract enforcement 
Let us assume a seller i and a buyer j are engaged in a transaction, TAij. The transaction, TAij, has a certain 




TAij respectively, and is governed by a contract ACij that may be 
at least partly enforceable through courts. Regardless of the actual transaction, the relationship between the 
seller and the buyer, RSij, has the value V
i
RSij for the seller and V
j
RSij for the buyer arising from quasi-rents 
generated by the value of future transactions, high switching costs or specific investments in the relationship. 
 
Consider the following example of a contract breach: The seller delivers the good, but the buyer refuses to 
pay. What will the seller do? We assume that the seller can apply three enforcement mechanisms: (1) no 
enforcement, (2) self-enforcement (termination) and (3) court enforcement. All three mechanisms are 
connected with different costs and benefits. As we define losses in benefits as costs, we can treat the problem 
as one of cost minimization. The costs of ￿no enforcement￿, CNE,  is equal to the loss of the actual 
transaction￿s value. Since ￿no enforcement￿ will, as we assume, not disturb the relationship, its possible 
value is maintained. 
 
CNE = VTA        ( 1 )  
 
Self-enforcement, in contrast, is based on the termination of the relationship. Therefore, the costs of self-
enforcement, CSE, are not only the loss in the transaction￿s value but also the loss in the value of the 
relationship. 
 
CSF = VTA + VR S         (2) 
 
Court enforcement, finally, causes some fix costs, F, but has the benefit that the seller will get back at least 
part of the transaction￿s value, αVTA. In addition, we assume that court enforcement has negative effects on 
the relationship between seller and buyer. It may cause the termination of the relationship combined with a 
partial compensation for financial losses. Alternatively, court enforcement may not fully destroy, but may 
reduce the value of the relationship. For that, we introduce βVRS as a measure of how courts preserve the 
relationship or compensate for losses. Hence, both parameters α and β indicate the ability of courts to 
prevent or compensate for losses. We assume that the parameters can take any value between zero and one, 
which implies that over-compensation is not possible. The costs of enforcing contracts through courts are the 
direct fixed costs and the unenforceable part of the transaction￿s and relationship￿s values 
 
CCF = F + (1-α)VTA + (1-β)VRS      ( 3 )  The parameters F, α and β are affected by the effectiveness of the legal system. The less effective the legal 
system, the higher the fixed costs, F, and the lower the remaining parameters, α and β. In addition, the 
contract, AC, has an impact on the parameters. If AC is a written contract specifying all terms of the 
transaction and the relationship, F should be low and α and β should be high, which lowers the costs of court 
enforcement. Finally, the parameters may be influenced by characteristics of the seller and buyer. Seller 
specific characteristics, such as size or education, may influence the fixed costs F. Buyer specific 
characteristics, such as size, location or liquidity may affect the parameters α and β. If the buyer refuses to 
pay because of bankruptcy, α and β will likely be low. 
 
In order to compare the different enforcement mechanisms, let us first assume that the relationship has no 
value, VRS = 0. In this case, the equations (1) to (3) can be rewritten as 
 
CNE = VTA       ( 5 )  
 
CSE = VTA         ( 6 )  
 
CCE = F + (1-α)VTA         ( 7 )  
 
This case is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Enforcement Costs and Transaction Value. 
 
It then makes no difference if a breach of contract is answered with termination or not, CNE = CSE In this case, 
the threshold, VTA*, to enforce contracts through courts, or, in other words, the maximum of financial losses 
the seller will accept before he takes legal action can be defined by CNE,SE = CCF or 
 
VTA = F + (1-α)VTA       ( 8 )  
 
VTA*=F/α        ( 9 )  
 
The maximum financial losses a firm is willing to accept, VTA*, is strictly increasing in F and decreasing in 
α. It is independent of the transaction￿s actual value and only determined by those factors that influence F 
and α. These include the legal system, the contract and the characteristics of the seller and the buyer. 
 
However, the judgment whether a contract governing a transaction is regarded as enforceable through courts, 
is likely to be influenced by the transaction￿s value. A cost minimization behavior requires that 
 
VTA < VTA* → no-enforcement, self-enforcement      (10) 
 
VTA > VTA* →  court  enforcement        (11) 
 
This means that those sellers who perform only low value transactions or transactions in which the potential 
loss from a contract breach is low will not consider court enforcement a real alternative. They are more likely 
to negate the question whether they regard an agreement or contract as enforceable through courts. Consider now the case where the relationship itself has a value, VRS>0. In this case, the following equations 
hold 
CNE = VTA 
 
CSF = VTA + VRS 
 
CCF = F + (1-α)VTA + (1-β)VRS 
 
If the relationship has a value, ￿self-enforcement￿ is always suboptimal and will be strictly dominated by ￿no 
enforcement,￿ since the condition CSF > CNE is always fulfilled. Thus, we can reduce the analysis to the 
comparison of ￿no enforcement￿ versus ￿court enforcement.￿ The threshold can be defined as VTA** or as  
 
VRS*. 
CNE = CCF 
VTA = F + (1-α)VTA + (1-β)VRS  
 
VTA** = (F + (1-β)VRS)/ α      ( 1 2 )  
 
VRS*= (αVTA - F)/(1-β)        ( 1 3 )  
 
VTA** indicates the lower limit of financial losses for which the seller would take legal action, while VRS* 
defines the upper limit in the value of the relationship for which the seller would take the buyer to court. This 




Figure 2. Enforcement Costs and the Value of the Relationship. 
 
Again, cost minimization would imply the following behavior: 
 
VRS < VRS* →  court  enforcement     (14) 
 
VRS > VRS* →  no-enforcement      (15) 
 
From the empirical point of view, however, we are more interested in the lower limit of financial losses as 
indicated in equation (12). In addition to equation (8), equation (12) is strictly increasing in the value of the 
relationship, VRS. 
 
The equations (10) and (12) also indicate that the boundary between ￿no enforcement￿ and ￿court 
enforcement￿ is dependent on VTA and VRS. This boundary defines the range of the transaction values and the 
relationship values for which a contract will be regarded as enforceable through the courts, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.   
 
 
Figure 3. The Boundary of Court Enforcement. 
 
If the value of the transaction, VTA, is lower than VTA*, as in the first case, it is not profitable to take the 
buyer to court. Thus, sellers conducting low value transactions are less likely to regard contracts as 
enforceable through courts. If VTA > VTA*, buyers will consider court enforcement when VRS < VRS*, as the 
second case demonstrates. However, if for a given value of the transaction the value of the relationship 
exceeds the threshold VRS*, then buyers will again take no legal action, as the  third case represents. 
 
Inside the range of possible court enforcement (VTA > VTA*, VRS < VRS*), the willingness to accept losses 
before taking legal action increases with the value of the relationship. Thus, we expect the probability that 
buyers regard their contracts as enforceable to increase with the value of the transaction, but decreases with 
the value of the relationship. The acceptance of financial losses, however, is independent from the value of 
the transaction and increases with the value of the relationship. Both the perceived enforceability and the 
acceptance of financial losses, will, nevertheless, be influenced by the legal system, the type of agreement or 
contract and the characteristics of the seller and buyer. 
 
It is also relevant to extend the above analysis to cases of private enforcement. This refers to renegotiations 
or sanctions in business networks. Let us assume that private enforcement is associated with the fixed costs, 
F￿, and results in the benefits that occur from a reduction in the losses of the transaction￿s value, δVTA, and 
the relationship￿s value, ϕVRS. Again, δ and ϕ can take any value between zero and one indicating the ability 
to enforce the contract privately and to preserve the value of the relationship. In the following case, private 
enforcement has lower fixed costs than court enforcement, F￿<F, the ability to preserve the value of the 
transaction is lower δ<α, but the ability to preserve the value of the relationship is higher, ϕ>β, than through 
court enforcement. The costs of private enforcement can be written as 
 
CPE = F￿ + (1-δ)VTA + (1-ϕ)VR S       (16) 
 
The whole set of relevant alternative enforcement mechanism is expressed then by 
 
CNE = VTA 
 
CCE = F + (1-α)VTA + (1-β)VR S       (17) 
 
CPE = F￿ + (1-δ) VTA + (1-ϕ)VRS 
 
We are particularly interested in how far private enforcement mechanisms affect the lower level of financial 
losses for which a seller would take a buyer to court. This threshold VTA*** is given by 
CCE= CPE 
F + (1-α)VTA + (1-β)VRS = F￿ + (1-δ) VTA + (1-ϕ)VRS 
 
VTA*** = (F ￿ F￿ + (ϕ-β)VRS)/(α-δ)      ( 1 8 )  The threshold increases in F, ϕ, δ and VRS and decreases in F￿, β and α as long as ϕ >β. Under certain 
circumstances, the threshold VTA*** is greater than VTA** (see Figure 3.). This is the case when F￿ → 0, ϕ 
→ 1 and δ → α. 
 
In conclusion, the availability of private enforcement mechanisms increases the lower limit of financial 
losses for which a seller would take the buyer to court. It also decreases the probability that seller  regard 
their contracts as enforceable through courts. 
 
Summarizing the arguments 
The reduced form model can capture the boundary between ￿no enforcement￿ and ￿court-enforcement￿ in a 
simple and intuitive way. The boundary is the upper limit of financial losses firms would accept before 
taking legal action or the lower boundary of financial losses for which firms will take a buyer to court. The 
factors influencing responses can then be identified more precisely. 
 
The likelihood that sellers perceive agreements with their buyers as enforceable through courts should 
increase with the efficiency of the legal system, the formalization and completeness of a contract and the 
volume of the transaction. On the other hand, that likelihood is expected to decrease with relationships of 
greater value and with the availability of the private enforcement mechanisms. 
 
The acceptance of financial losses is positively related to the value of the relationship and the availability of 
private enforcement capacities. But it is negatively related to the efficiency of the legal system and the 
formalization of contracts. The acceptance of financial losses is independent of the value of the transaction. 
 
INVESTIGATING THE DATA 
 
We will now empirically investigate the question about Polish hog farmers who regard their agreements or 
contracts as enforceable through courts and why they are nonetheless willing to accept financial losses before 
taking legal action. We collected the data in 1999 in two regions in Poland: Poznan and Sieradz. This survey 
targeted the marketing behavior of hog farmers during transition. The data therefore include detailed 
information on transactions and contractual relations between hog producers and their buyers (see Table 1 
for the description of variables). This affords the unique opportunity to analyze the relationship between 
different governance structures and their enforcement mechanisms with a particular focus on the role and 
costs of enforcing contracts through the legal system. Given the characteristics of the responses, we estimate 
two model types: a maximum likelihood estimator, MLE, for the qualitative response on the enforceability 
and an ordinary least square estimator, OLS, for acceptance of financial losses. The OLS model is applied to 
the sub-sample only. In both models we apply a variety of specifications to test the robustness our results. 
 
The perceived enforceability of agreements or contracts through courts: MLE results 
Table 2 presents the MLE results of the binomial logit model. For purposes of interpretation, we calculate 
marginal effects and use different specifications by subsequently adding or removing groups of variables. 
 
Among the AC variables, which capture the contract￿s characteristics, only the variable AC1 for 
written contracts is significant in all model specifications at the 1% or 5% level. Hence, farmers 
having formalized contracts perceive ad greater chance of enforcing them through the courts. This 
supports Lyons (1996: 27) statement: ￿The agreement need not to be written, but it is obviously 
difficult to enforce it if it is not written or witnessed by a third party.￿ Written contracts increase the 
verifiability of the agreement by a third party and lower the costs of enforcing them through courts.  
 
Transaction variables within the TA group prouce mixed results. The frequency of the transaction TA1 has 
the expected negative sign, although it is  not significant. The volume of the transaction TA2 is significant 
positive at the 5% level in three out of four specifications. This result supports theoretical considerations that 
self-enforcement or private enforcement is cost minimizing when the transaction value is low. As the value 
of transactions increase, sellers are more likely to consider their contracts to be enforceable through courts. 
 
Among the relationship characteristics RS, the ￿dependence on the buyer￿ reveals a robust and significantly 
negative effect on the probability that a contract is regarded as enforceable. This clearly supports the view that court enforcement can harm the value of a relationship and that sellers prefer to rely on private 
enforcement mechanisms. The duration of business relationship and relation-specific investments shows the 
expected sign, however, they are not significant. 
 
The buyer and seller characteristics, BC and SC, prove to be of partial importance. Among the BC variables, 
the type of buyer, a trader or a large processor, shows no significant impact. However, the distance variable 
does. If the buyer is distant, the likelihood that a farmer will consider his of her contract as enforceable 
through the courts is reduced. Long-distance businesses appear to raise the costs of taking legal action. 
Among the SC variables, only the farmer￿s age has a significant negative impact. 
 
The BE variables used to describe the business environment prove also to be relevant. Better access to 
information significantly improves the likelihood that farmers perceive their contracts as enforceable through 
courts. Thus, information plays a critical role in transition economies. Furthermore, the membership in a 
producer association shows a negative, although not always significant, influence. The business 
environment, therefore, bears influence on the perception of court enforcement. 
 
The characteristics of the legal system, LS, were only included in one specification, MLE-11. Both variables 
show the expected signs but are not significant. 
 
Finally, the regional dummy RE consistently shows a significant negative impact on the likelihood that a 
farmer consider his of her contract as enforceable through the courts. Thus, there are still some are due to 
regional differences that are not reflected by other variables. 
 
The willingness to accept financial losses before going to the court ￿ OLS results 
The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 3. Most remarkable is the fact that all relationship 
variables, RS, have a highly significant, positive effect on the willingness to accept losses before enforcing 
contracts legally. It is not only the perceived dependence on the buyer, but also the duration of the 
relationship that seems to value the relationship. Unlike the MLE regression, the proxy for buyer-specific 
investments, RS3, turned out to be significant. This result, robust in all model specifications, confirms the 
hypothesis that the value of a relationship affects the maximum financial losses a buyer is willing to accept, 
hence the reduced form model we presented in section 3. 
 
A somewhat surprising outcome is that the written-contract variable AC1 positively influences the magnitude 
of losses. Since the contracts usually cover only a one-year period they contribute to the relationship￿s value 
by incorporating the option of future sales with the same buyer. Additionally, they often secure price 
premiums for high-quality hogs and thereby safeguard quality-specific investments (Beckmann and Boger 
2002). 
 
As the correlation matrix for the sub-sample exhibits, the written contract variable, AC1 is highly correlated 
with the large processor variable BC2. Therefore, AC1 and BC2 both express a formalized and valuable 
relationship. 
 
The variables for the business environment show that better access to information, BE1, and membership in a 
producer association, BE2, significantly increase the acceptance of losses. BE2 raises the maximum level of 
financial losses by more than 4,000 Polish zloty. This might be explained by stronger private enforcement 
capacities through business networks or the potential negative network effects court enforcement brings 
about. 
 
The seller characteristics, SC, are hardly significant. Only in one model, the variable SC1, agricultural 
enterprise, causes a negative impact on the willingness to accept losses.  
 
Finally, the LS variables generate surprising results. We would expect farmers who state that the 
enforceability of contracts has deteriorated would accept more financial losses, and vice versa. The model, 
however, indicates that those who perceive court enforcement to be more efficient are also willing to accept 
higher losses. How could this be? The indirect costs of court enforcement have to exceed the direct costs. If 
the direct cost of court enforcement decreases, the indirect costs must increase. This can only be the case if 
better court enforcement stimulates relation-specific investments. This might be the case here. In summary, the OLS estimates provide solid support for the hypothesis that the value of a relationship 
determines the losses farmers are willing to accept before enforcing contracts legally. Farmers perceive court 
enforcement to severely damage a relationship￿s value. In addition, our results provide further evidence that 
the threshold for court enforcement increases when private enforcement mechanisms apart from self-




The aim of the paper is to identify factors that determine the extent to which actors consider the court as a 
practicable mechanism to enforce their contracts. The most important results contributing to theory and 
empirics of contract enforcement are that (1) the farmers￿ responses to our questions could be explained by 
cost-benefit calculations with regard to court use, (2) the costs of court enforcement are not only dependent 
on the efficiency of the legal system, but also on the type of contract and the value of the relationship, (3) 
indirect costs of court enforcement can play a significant role and (4) the use of court enforcement is 
dependent on the availability of alternative enforcement mechanism. 
 
There are, however, clear limitations to our study. First, we have limited information on the efficiency of the 
legal system. The enforceability of contracts could decline for many reasons, not only for reasons related to 
the legal system. The question was targeted at a specific buyer-seller relationship; we do not have a solid 
general judgment on the efficiency of courts. Second, we did not address specific issues of agreements and 
contracts but asked generally about contract enforceability. Some contract elements may be easier to enforce 
than others, e.g. delayed payments vs. cheating in quality measurement. Future research could benefit from 
focusing on improved information about the general efficiency of legal systems and details about the 
enforceability of single contractual aspects. 
 
Another challenge is to get better data on direct and indirect costs of court enforcement in different 
institutional settings. Analysis by Djankov et al. (2002) promises a valuable way to pursue this endeavor. It 
certainly enhances knowledge to study all possible and observable contract enforcement mechanisms 
simultaneously (Henderly et al 1998; K￿hk￿nen et al. 2001) or the consequences of courts, e.g. the question 
whether firms or individuals allocate their resources differently if they regard contracts as enforceable 
through courts (McMillan and Woodruff (1999b; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002). 
 
Finally, the studies which have been carried out in transition and developing countries have no equivalent in 
developed market economies. How many hog farmers in the USA, Germany or France would answer that 
they can enforce agreements or contracts with their main buyers through courts? Do we expect positive 
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